We use Monthly Interest Rate Survey (MIRS) data for April 1997 through May 2003 to estimate the effect of "conforming" status on the effective interest rate for 30-year fixed-rate mortgages. We show that plausible econometric refinements materially affect the "jumbo-conforming spread" as measured in the existing literature, and that the treatment of loan size is particularly important. We borrow from the discrimination literature to derive a new way to estimate this effect and conclude that the jumbo-conforming spread is about 25 basis points, with some evidence of decline since late 2001.
specifications, the estimated spread is at least 24 bps. We also divide the sample into two subperiods, separated by a November 2001 regulatory change that made it less costly for banks to securitize private pools of jumbo mortgages. Logic suggests that this regulatory innovation should have reduced the jumbo-conforming spread, and we find that it did. Prior to the change, the estimated spread was 26-27 bps; afterward, it fell to 21-20 bps.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I briefly reviews the past literature and motivates the study. Section II discusses estimation issues. Section III describes the MIRS data for our selected time period. Results are presented in Sections IV through VI. The last section concludes and briefly summarizes the implications of our findings.
I. Literature Review
Two U.S. housing GSEs (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) have become integral to the mortgage market via their willingness to securitize 1-4 family mortgage loans below a certain principal amount, the "conforming loan limit." A government agent annually adjusts this limit to reflect changes in the average price of houses sold in the U.S. 3 Anecdotal evidence suggests that mortgagors near the conforming limit often take out a second mortgage in order to keep the bulk of their funds under the conforming limit. This phenomenon can be seen clearly in our sample of nearly one million new, fixed-rate mortgages originated between April 1997 and May 2003.
Figure 1 is a histogram of these mortgage loans ranked by their size relative to each year's conforming loan limit. Naturally, the number of loans declines as loan size increases. But notice the spike at 100% of the conforming loan limit and the "dip" just after that. Figure 2 employs a finer scale to make both the spike and the dip more visible. Clearly, many borrowers take the maximum conforming loan, and there are few loans "just over" the limit.
The most common explanation for the concentration of loans at the conforming limit is that the GSEs create a more liquid secondary market for loans they can purchase. The GSEs provide credit enhancement for pools of qualifying mortgages, and they may add to the demand for conforming loans by purchasing the associated mortgage-backed securities (MBS) for their retained portfolios. 4 In a competitive market, the ability to sell conforming (but not jumbo) mortgages into a more liquid secondary market should reduce the effective interest rate on newlyoriginated conforming mortgages (Cotterman and Pearce [1996] ). If so, one is left wondering about the (few) borrowers who take out mortgages just slightly above the conforming limit. Did credit problems prevent them from securing additional funds? For this reason, previous researchers have omitted such borrowers from their samples (Passmore et al. [2002] , Passmore [2003] ). We return to this issue below.
Many researchers have tried to estimate the pure, ceteris paribus rate premium required for non-conforming 1-4 family mortgage loans: How much more does a large borrower have to pay, after controlling for all other measurable features of her loan? Estimating this premium is the first, but not the last, step in assessing the social benefits provided by the GSEs. 5 McKenzie's
[2002] excellent summary of past studies (especially his Table 1 ) permits our own review to be brief. With only one exception (Ambrose et al. [2004] ), prior researchers have studied the
Federal Housing Finance Board's Monthly Interest Rate Survey data (MIRS). This monthly data
set contains information from a set of voluntary reporters about mortgage loans closed during the last five days of each month. The MIRS data provide no information about borrowers' creditworthiness, which complicates the identification of conforming loans. The housing GSEs purchase only high-quality loans below a certain size. Because the MIRS data do not identify "high quality" loans, we cannot observe the borrower's credit quality and hence cannot definitively identify which loans are truly conforming. The data permit us only to differentiate 4 Critics have focused on the social value of these retained portfolios. See, for example, Jaffee [2003, 2005] ). 5 The other steps lie outside the scope of this paper. But see Blinder et al. [2004] .
between "jumbo" and "not jumbo" loans. We take the liberty of referring to this differential as the "jumbo-conforming spread." Hendershott and Shilling [1989] (HS) were the first to estimate the jumbo-conforming spread with MIRS data, and their methodology has influenced subsequent research. They observed that the GSEs' mortgage pool guarantees grew from "under 5 percent to over 50 percent" of the market between the early 1980s and 1986, and sought to examine the impact of this development on the jumbo-conforming spread. Using data for three months (May, June, July) in 1978 and 1986, they estimated separate pricing equations for 1978 and 1986 of the form:
where RM i is the i th loan's effective interest rate (defined as the annual contract rate of interest plus an amortized amount (linear, over ten years) of any fees charged at closing), J i is a dummy variable equal to unity if the loan's principal amount exceeds the current conforming loan limit (a "jumbo"), and zero otherwise, X i is a vector of loan characteristics such as loan size, loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, month dummies, and a dummy for loans secured by a new home.
Within each time period, α 1 measures the jumbo-conforming spread. HS estimate this coefficient as 5 bps in 1978 and 29-39 bps in 1986. The estimated effect of the housing GSEs on the spread is therefore 24-34 bps in 1986. Many other researchers have used the same basic methodology to measure the value of conforming status (e.g., Cotterman and Pearce [1996] , ICF [1990] McKenzie [2002] , Naranjo and Toevs [2002] , Passmore [2003] , Passmore et al. [forthcoming] , Pearce [2000] , and U.S. CBO [2001] ). This research provides some evidence that the spread has declined over time. 6 Ambrose et al. [2004] utilize a unique private data set provided by a major mortgage originator. Unlike the MIRS data, these 1995-1997 data include an important indicator of credit 6 Passmore et al. [forthcoming] estimate the jumbo-conforming difference as only 17 basis points, which is lower than most previous estimates. They "attribute [their] lower estimate to the later sample (April 1997 through May 2003 , which is consistent with trends in the established literature…" (footnote 18, page 14 
II. Methodology
The standard model for estimating the jumbo-conforming spread has resembled Hendershott and Shilling's [1989] specification (1), which suffers from three potential flaws.
First, if the variables included in the vector X i omit determinants of the loan rate that are correlated with J, the estimate of α 1 may be biased. Subsequent research has identified additional variables that affect mortgage rates. Second, if (1) is estimated over several time periods, the explanatory variables must control for intertemporal changes in capital market conditions.
Finally, the same loan characteristics might be valued differently in the markets for conforming versus jumbo loans. If so, equation (1) imposes inappropriate constraints on the coefficients. 7 The private data set identifies which non-jumbo loans were sold to GSEs, which is a clear improvement over the MIRS. However, the data do not indicate whether the non-jumbo loans not sold to GSEs were eligible for purchase by a GSE. To control for this data problem, the authors code non-jumbo observations not sold to GSEs as GSE-eligible if the borrower's FICO score exceeded 620. 8 Theoretically, an estimate like Ambrose et al.'s should exceed one obtained from the MIRS data, because the latter data include some low-quality loans, which presumably would carry higher effective rates. 9 The authors use mortgage spreads (effective yield less the then-current 10-year U.S. Treasury yield) as their dependent variable. Not only does the specification impose a unit coefficient for the 10-year Treasury, it also assumes identical ten-year interest rate sensitivities for conforming and jumbo loans. Neither constraint seems justified.
Recent researchers using the MIRS data have included the following loan features in the vector X:
LTV_i:
A set of three dummy variables, equal to unity if the loan-to-value ratio at takedown is:
• greater than 75% and less than or equal to 80% (LTV_1)
• greater than 80% and less than or equal to 90% (LTV_2)
• greater than 90% and less than or equal to 100% (LTV_3).
MTGCO:
A dummy variable equal to unity if the loan is originated by a mortgage company (as opposed to a bank or a thrift).
THRIFT:
A dummy variable equal to unity if the loan is originated by a thrift institution (as opposed to a bank or a mortgage company).
NEW:
A dummy variable equal to unity if the loan is associated with a newlybuilt house.
FEES:
A dummy variable equal to unity if the loan's effective rate (the dependent variable) includes positive fees and charges amortized over a 10-year period.
PRIN:
The loan's principle amount (divided by $1,000,000).
The LTV dummy variables presumably capture objective default probabilities. Since we omit LTV_0 (LTV ≤ 0.75), we expect all three of these variables to get positive coefficients. The two institutional dummies (MTGCO and THRIFT) capture any systematic differences between loans originated by these firms, relative to those originated by commercial banks. Ambrose et al. [2001] , who found that RM is positively related to the volatility of house prices, presumably as an indicator of the default option's value. Some authors also include month or year dummies in (1), to capture seasonal variations in homeowners' closing date preferences or intertemporal variations in the market price of mortgage risk (e.g. Ambrose et al. [2004] ). All this implies that a more appropriate method for estimating α 1 with a panel specification is:
where Z t is a vector of variables describing market conditions in period t. This specification recognizes the close integration of the mortgage market into other U.S. capital markets.
However, (2) retains any biases that may arise from constraining the coefficients to be identical for all mortgages, regardless of size. Both theory and empirical evidence deny that such restrictions are appropriate. For example, the more expensive homes that secure jumbo mortgages have greater price uncertainty (Ambrose et al. [2001] ), and the GSEs require private mortgage insurance for all purchased loans with LTV ratios greater than 80%. Both of these facts are consistent with the findings of McKenzie [2002] and Blinder et al. [2004] that jumbo loan rates are more sensitive to the loan-to-value ratio than are conforming rates. Jumbo loan borrowers may also be more aggressive in exercising their prepayment options, although an initial principal amount just slightly above the conforming limit may indicate credit or liquidity problems that curtail refinancing options. In short, there are many reasons to believe that the slope coefficients of a pricing equation like (2) might differ for conforming versus jumbo loans.
The impact of conforming status on RM is analytically similar to a question that has been studied in the literature on discrimination for thirty years: Does education have differential effects on the wage rate of Blacks versus Whites? 12 Adopting that methodology to our problem, we can allow for differential sensitivity of mortgage rates to the X it vector by modifying specification (2) to get:
Here the new coefficient vector β measures the differential sensitivity of the pricing of jumbo loans to the various features in X it , and α 1 measures the effect of jumbo status per se--beyond any effects attributable to differential pricing. Following Blinder [1973] , a still more complete separation of jumbo and conforming loans' features can be obtained by estimating separate pricing regressions for each group:
for conforming loans (4a)
for jumbo loans,
The superscript "c" denotes conforming, "j" denotes jumbo. This more general specification removes the remaining constraints imposed by (3), namely that the effects of Z t are the same in both markets and that all loans have the same error structure.
Just as in the discrimination literature, specification (4) can be used to decompose the difference between jumbo and conforming interest rates into a portion attributable to the groups' characteristics (differences in X) and a portion attributable to the differential valuations of the same characteristics across the two markets (differences in coefficients Now using lower case symbols to denote means and estimated coefficients, we can subtract the expected value of (5a) from that of (5b) to obtain:
This equation decomposes the average jumbo-conforming spread into two parts. The first measures the portion of the mean spread that is due to differences in the typical loan characteristics of jumbo versus conforming loans, w j it -w c it , valuing those characteristics at estimated prices from the market for conforming loans (a). This part of the rate differential would presumably exist even in the absence of any GSE effect. The second term in (6) is more interesting. It measures the portion of the higher yield on a jumbo loan that arises because it is priced differently than an otherwise-identical conforming loan. If conforming status reduces loan rates ceteris paribus, we expect this term to be positive.
Of course, using the price vector from the conforming loan market (a) to value the differences in mean characteristics is arbitrary; we could just as well have used the prices from the jumbo market (b). Doing so leads to a different, but equally valid, decomposition: 
The critical second term of this decomposition now asks the question: How much more would the average conforming loan cost if it were priced as a jumbo instead? Since neither (6) nor (7) has any inherent claim to superiority, we will use both decompositions in what follows. It turns out that the choice does not matter much.
III. Data
We follow many previous researchers in using the Federal Housing Finance Board's Monthly Interest Rate Survey (MIRS) to estimate the effect of conforming status on mortgage loan rates. Each month, the FHFB collects a sample of conventional, fully-amortizing, singlefamily, non-farm, purchase-money mortgage loans closed during the last five business days of the previous month. We study the 74-month period from April 1997 to May 2003, during which the MIRS data set has information on more than one million fixed-rate loans originated by a sample of U.S. mortgage lenders. 13 The loan characteristics listed earlier are all taken from the MIRS data base. We identify jumbo loans by a dummy variable (called J above) equal to unity if the loan's principal exceeds the conforming loan limit for the year in which the loan closed.
We matched each mortgage with variables describing conditions in the fixed-income markets at the time the loan was closed-the vector Z it above. 14 RM it should vary with these conditions. For example, we control for the height and slope of the yield curve by including both a short-term and a long-term interest rate among the explanatory variables: CM_1 = the monthly average of daily yields on the constant-maturity Treasury bond with one year to maturity as reported on the Federal Reserve's H.15 report, CM_10 = the monthly average yield on the constant-maturity Treasury bond with ten years to maturity as reported on the Federal Reserve's H.15 report.
The value of a mortgage prepayment (call) option depends on the expected future volatility of interest rates, which we measure as:
13 This time period was used by Passmore [2003] and by Passmore, et al. [forthcoming] , which facilitates comparison. 14 Each month's mortgage data apply to the last five business days of the month, but loan rates on fixed-rate mortgages are often locked in much earlier. We use monthly averages to capture the level of market rates during the (un-specified) time these mortgages were being priced. We discuss the robustness of our results to these measurement decisions in Section VI below. VOL_10 = the standard deviation of the daily 10-year Treasury rate over the sixty trading days preceding the month-end at which loans are closed.
The market's aversion to default risk varies substantially over time. To control for such variations, we include the spread between Baa and Aaa bond yields: SPREAD = the monthly average yield spread (Baa -Aaa) for U.S. industrial bonds with ten years to maturity, obtained from Bloomberg.
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Finally, Ambrose et al. [2001 Ambrose et al. [ , 2004 show that house price volatility significantly affects mortgage pricing, and that jumbo loans are more sensitive to this uncertainty. We therefore follow Ambrose et al. [2004] in constructing a measure of house price volatility to capture variations in a mortgage's default option:
HPI_STD = the standard deviation of OFHEO's state-level house price index over the preceding eight quarters for the state in which the mortgage property is located.
All previous studies trimmed the MIRS data sets, as described in However, some of the allegedly fixed-rate mortgages report rates that are suspiciously below Freddie Mac's reported mean monthly rates for such instruments. For example, while the Freddie Mac monthly rate series varied between 5.48% and 8.52% over our sample period, some MIRS observations contain allegedly "fixed-rate" effective loan rates as low as 2.96%. Such low rates seem more likely to describe the initial "teaser" rate on an adjustable-rate loan than the true fixed rate on a 30-year loan. Other data points report rates that are substantially above the Freddie Mac monthly average, which might reflect credit problems that make the loan nonconforming irrespective of its principal amount. Following McKenzie [2002] , we remove such suspicious observations from the sample by excluding loans with an effective rate more than 50 basis points below, or more than 200 bps above, the corresponding Freddie Mac monthly average for 30-year fixed-rate mortgages.
We also follow previous researchers by eliminating loans whose principal amounts are less than 25% or more than 200% of the contemporaneous conforming loan limit. We do this to limit the impact of loan scale on our estimates. If underwriting or servicing mortgages entails any fixed cost components, smaller loans require higher interest rates to recover the lender's out-ofpocket costs. In principle, this effect can be incorporated into a regression, and we try to do that.
But the proper specification is not obvious (more on this below), so we limit the range of included loan sizes. We also omit from our regressions the set of jumbo loans that exceed the conforming loan limit by a small amount. HS were the first to document the unusual behavior of these "nearconforming" loans, and McKenzie [2002] later paid them considerable attention. Such loans might be unusual because (a) the originator can sell them to the GSEs after holding them until year-end (which should reduce their rates if conforming status is valuable), or (b) borrowers who cannot obtain additional financing to get their primary mortgage under the conforming loan limit may have unobserved (to the econometrician) credit problems, which should raise their rates. So we exclude near-conforming loans from our primary sample. Specifically, we omit from the sample all jumbo loans whose principal amount lies below the following year's conforming loan limit.
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Application of all of these filters left a sample of 964,634 observations. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables used in our primary analysis. Out of nearly one million loans, about 5.5% exceeded the conforming limit for the year in which they were originated. The monthly average effective rate of interest (RM) ranges from 4.98% to 10.52% in our data, with a mean of 7.22%. The mean (median) RM on jumbo loans exceeds that of conforming loans by 4 (12) basis points. The average spread over 10-year Treasuries is 2.03%, with a relatively large 16 The conforming loan limit increased in every year of our sample, with increases ranging 5.3% to 9.3%. This screen removes only 5,941 loans, constituting 11.3% of the jumbos. Note that Figure 2 includes these near conformers, even though we omit them from the regressions.
standard deviation (0.42%). The mean and median loan-to-value (LTV) ratios are both very close to 80%, although jumbos are slightly (but significantly) less leveraged: About 83% of jumbos had an LTV ratio of 80% or less, compared to 61% for non-jumbos. Higher LTV mortgages expose the investor to more potential loss in the event of default, so we expect them to be priced higher. However, conforming loans with an LTV ratio greater than 80% are required to obtain private mortgage insurance to protect the investor from loss in the event of default. For this reason, we expect differential pricing of this default risk between jumbos and conformers.
Jumbos are more likely to be originated by thrifts (32.8% vs. 26.0%), but less likely to be originated by mortgage companies (61.5% vs. 68.0%). Loans originated by mortgage companies account for 67.6% of the sample, and mortgages funded to purchase new construction make up 17.3%. California mortgages are known to be the most common in MIRS; they comprise 16.4%
of our sample and 39.4% of our jumbos. We follow Passmore [2003] by including dummy variables for four states with relatively high volume of jumbo loans: CA, MD, NJ, and VA. MD, NJ, and VA together account for 10.5% of our sample and 16.4% of our jumbos.
IV. Results from Single-Equation Regression Models
We begin our analysis with the simplest specification, equation (1), reported in the first column of Table 2 . 17 This pooled regression yields a very high estimate (38 bps) for the jumboconforming spread, but its 2 R is quite low (0.16) and the coefficients on the LTV variables do not increase monotonically, which is odd. Moreover, the estimated scale economies seem implausibly large: The INV_PRIN coefficient of 0.056 implies that a $100,000 loan would cost 28 bps more than a $200,000 loan, ceteris paribus. By comparison, the estimated scale coefficient in the next column (0.021) implies only an 11 bps price advantage.
a. Controlling for Changing Market Conditions over Times
Column (1) includes no controls for time-series variation in financial market conditions-the Z vector discussed above. Merely adding dummy variables to identify calendar years (in column (2)), increases the 2 R statistic to 0.70, reduces the estimated scale economies by nearly two thirds, and produces LTV coefficients that rise monotonically. The estimated coefficient on the jumbo loan dummy falls to 22 bps, which is more in line with previous estimates. Including year dummies also substantially affects the estimated coefficients on FEES, the MTGCO and THRIFT originator dummies, and the mortgage premium paid on a NEW house.
Clearly, something that changes over time matters.
A more economically satisfying way to control for time variation focuses on conditions in financial markets. Column (3) replaces the year dummies with a set of five financial market variables pertaining to the month of origination: the short-term (CM_1) and long-term (CM_10)
Treasury rates, rate volatility (VOL_10), the industrial bond spread (SPREAD), and house-price volatility (HPI_STD). The significantly positive coefficient on SPREAD indicates that mortgage rates rise with the market price of default risk. Both VOL_10 and HPI_STD get significantly positive coefficients, consistent with the hypotheses that more volatility raises a mortgage's embedded prepayment and default options, respectively. This specification produces a slightly smaller estimate of the value of conforming status: 20 bps. Column (4) combines the year dummies (which now matter much less) with the financial-conditions variables, which boosts the 2 R to 0.80 and moves the jumbo-conforming spread estimate back up to 22 bps.
Seasonality is another issue. Figure 3 , which plots the monthly pattern of loan closings, reveals that both conforming and jumbo loans close disproportionately during the spring and summer months, when people tend to move. 18 If resources could flow into and out of the mortgage underwriting business freely and costlessly, there should be no seasonal pattern in mortgage rates despite the obvious seasonality in demand. But supply-side frictions in the underwriting process may let some of this seasonality flow through to rates. We therefore add eleven month dummies (excluding JAN) in column (5) of Table 2 . These dummies get coefficients as high as 19.5 bps and the 2 R increases slightly to 0.81. The seasonal dummies reveal a pattern that is consistent with anecdotal evidence that families are anxious to change houses before the next school year begins. Relative to January, mortgage rates are low through May, rise steadily through September, and then generally decline through year end. We explore seasonal patterns further below. But the month dummies do not affect our other conclusions. In particular, the jumbo-conforming spread estimate increases only slightly (to 23 bps), and the coefficients of the LTV dummies remain monotone increasing. The specification in column (5) provides the basis for our subsequent regression analysis. Table 3 adds additional explanatory variables to our base regression specification. The first column repeats column (5) of Table 2 , but does not report the coefficients for the month, year, state, and originator dummies to save space. Column (2) allows the LTV measures of default risk to have separate coefficients for conforming and jumbo loans. We see that the slope is steeper for jumbos. This means that two loans with the same LTV, one jumbo and one conforming, would be priced differently, perhaps due to the requirement that conforming loans with LTV > 80% must provide private mortgage insurance.
b. Using Information on "Near Conforming" Loans
The specification in column (2) of Table 3 omits an important phenomenon initially documented by HS and explored further by McKenzie [2002] : the tendency of "near conforming" loans to carry lower rates near the end of a calendar year. The rationale is clear enough. The conforming loan limit is raised each January 1, based on the national average house price appreciation implied by MIRS data for the preceding October-October period. Competitive mortgage lenders should therefore anticipate the new limit, leading to lower rates for nearconforming jumbos late in the year. That said, an investor holding a near-conforming loan until the following January does run some risk. First, the housing GSEs will purchase seasoned mortgages only if they have not had any negative payment events. Second, the underwriter does not know the subsequent year's conforming loan limit with certainty until it is announced in late November. During the year, both of these sources of risk decline; and they are basically gone by late December because the new conforming limit is known and the borrower is scheduled to make no payments until the end of January. This suggests that December near-conforming loans may be special.
We define near-conforming loans as those with principal between the current and the subsequent year's conforming loan limits. Figure 3 exhibits a very sharp spike in nearconforming loan originations in December. Not only do 30% of the year's near-conforming loans close in December, but 35% of December's near-conforming loans are for exactly the following year's (already announced) conforming limit. This is clearly not a coincidence.
We investigate the impact of near-conforming status on loan pricing in column (3) of Table 3 , which adds six new dummy variables to identify near-conforming loans closed in each of the year's last six months. (The sample for this regression must now include the near-conformers, which were omitted previously.) Interestingly, we find no significant pricing effect through August. Near conformers are 5 to 8 bps more expensive in September and October (perhaps because credit quality issues dominate), but they are priced substantially lower in November (-9 bps) and December (-24 bps). Combining the coefficient on the jumbo dummy, J, with the one on DEC_NC indicates that December near-conforming loans are priced with no premium over conforming loans.
In fact, the coefficient on DEC_NC can be interpreted as another measure of the value of conforming status because these loans can be sold just a few days later with no risk and little cost of carry. It is striking that this coefficient almost exactly matches the estimated coefficients on J in columns (1) and (2). To confirm this finding, we ran another (unreported) regression on a sample that included only December's near-conforming loans and January's conforming loans.
In this specification, the dummy variable that identifies the near-conformers carries a negligible coefficient (0.017) that is statistically indistinguishable from zero (t-statistic of 0.371).
c. Differences by loan size
It is tempting to think that the jumbo-conforming spread can be estimated well by comparing two similar-sized loans, one on either side of the conforming loan limit. But that will not be true if the characteristics of these two types of loans are priced differently in the conforming versus non-conforming markets. Thus Table 4 looks in more detail at how loans of different sizes are priced.
Column (1) includes all conforming-sized loans in our sample, and column (6) includes all the jumbo loans (except the near-conformers). The intervening columns estimate regressions over subsets of the conforming (columns (2) and (3)) and jumbo (columns (4) and (5)) loans that increase in size as we move from left to right. By comparing the coefficient estimates across loan sizes, we can obtain further indications of whether our specification is reasonable. In addition, these regressions will be used in the decomposition exercises that follow.
What do we find? First, as we move up to larger loan classes, the sensitivity of the mortgage rate to the LTV ratio clearly rises--presumably reflecting a risk premium. For example, moving from LTV_2 to LTV_3 costs 2.7 bps in column (3) (large conformers) but 8.6 bp in column (4) (small jumbos). Second, jumbo loan rates are more sensitive to market risk aversion, as indicated by their higher coefficient estimates on SPREAD_10. In contrast to some previous speculation, however, jumbo rates are not substantially more sensitive to rate volatility (VOL_10) or housing price fluctuations (HPI_STD). Third, while all mortgage rates load more heavily on the 10-year Treasury rate (CM_10) than on the short rate (CM_1), jumbo loans are relatively more sensitive to changes in the short rate.
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Finally, the monthly seasonal patterns are substantially stronger for conformers than for jumbo loans. In sum, Table 4 clearly indicates that similar loan characteristics are priced differently in conforming versus jumbo loan markets. This is the main idea underlying our final method for computing the jumbo-conforming spread.
V. Estimating the Jumbo-Conforming Spread by the Decomposition Method
Our last and, we would argue, best method of estimating the jumbo-conforming spread is via the decomposition method explained earlier, since it controls for any systematic differences in jumbo versus conforming loans in either characteristics or pricing. Recall the basic idea. Using separate regressions (equations (5a) and (5b) above) for conforming and jumbo loans, which are reported in Table 4 , we can compute two decompositions, (6) and (7), which answer two similar but distinct questions:
• What would be the interest rate on the average conforming loan, controlling for all the factors in the regression, if it were priced like a jumbo loan?
• What would be the interest rate on the average jumbo loan, controlling for all the factors in the regression, if it were priced like a conforming loan?
The results are presented in Table 5 for the four non-overlapping size groups listed in Table 4 . Consider first the entries below the diagonal. For each group of loans, we compare its actual mean interest rate (rm) with a hypothetical fitted rm using a different group's estimated pricing coefficients to value the loan characteristics. The differences between the two estimates are then reported in the various cells. For example, the bottom entry in the first column (0.226)
indicates that the average loan between 120 and 200% of the conforming loan limit would have been priced 22.6 bps lower had it been priced like a loan between 25 and 80% of the limit. Our preferred estimates are the ones that compare loan pricing relatively close to (though both above and below) the conforming limit: these estimated conforming spreads are very close to one another in Table 5 : 23.5 and 25 bps.
VI. Robustness Checks
Our results are quite robust to alternative trims of the data, to various ways of measuring market conditions, and to the addition of dummy variables for state-level bankruptcy regimes.
We also find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the cost of private MBS originations affects quoted loan rates. However, the way we handle loan size econometrically does seem to matter. So we turn to that issue first.
a. Loan-scale Effects However, Passmore et al. [2003] use only a dummy variable for loans with principal below $100,000 to capture the potential scale effects in underwriting. Passmore et al. [forthcoming] argue that the proper regression specification omits any scale measure because:
When one includes the loan size as an explanatory variable, the resulting estimate of the jumbo-conforming spread essentially double counts the decrease in mortgage rates arising because of a large loan size… (page 23).
We find this explanation puzzling. As stated earlier, if the loan origination process includes any fixed costs, competition will force larger loans to bear lower interest rates in a competitive market for originations. Omitting loan size then biases the coefficient of the jumbo dummy downward:
since jumbo loans are relatively cheap dollars to lend, their loan rates will naturally be lower, ceteris paribus.
We evaluate the effect of loan size in the four regressions reported in Table 6 . We start with our base specification from the third column of Table 3 , then try three alternative PRIN treatments: ln(PRIN), a dummy variable (SMALL) equal to unity for loans whose principal is below $100,000, and completely omitting PRIN from the explanatory variables.
First, compare column 1 with columns 3 and 4. Our base case using INV_PRIN to measure loan size (col. 1) estimates the spread to be 24 bps. Using the SMALL dummy variable alone (col. 3) produces a slightly worse fit and an estimated jumbo-conforming spread of 17 bps;
and omitting PRIN altogether (col. 4) yields a still-worse fit and an estimated spread of 15 bps.
Except for the intercept terms, the other estimated coefficients remain pretty stable across all four specifications. This means, however, that the specifications in columns 3 and 4 have a troubling implication: Adding the coefficient on the jumbo dummy, J, to that of DEC_NC (the dummy for December near conformers) yields a significantly negative value (p < 0.0001), which implies that late-December near conformers are 5 to 7 bps cheaper than the average conforming mortgage.
This illogical implication leads us to believe that these two regressions are mis-specified. The market will price loans to recoup these origination costs, but it is not obvious how this will occur. If closing fees just compensate for the lender's processing costs, MIRS data should report
where RC is the annual mortgage contract rate. This implies that INV_PRIN is at least partially correct, and that the estimated coefficient on INV_PRIN equals (c 0 /10). However, borrowers could also "repay" their origination costs by agreeing to a higher coupon rate on their debt. The ensuing quasi-rents are like an interest-only strip, whose expected value at closing equals the lender's origination costs. Closing fees are now zero and it is no longer clear that INV_PRIN is the right functional form. The situation is further complicated if some of the originator's compensation is provided by profits on servicing the loan (or selling the servicing rights).
Assume that gross servicing costs are given by s 0 + s 1 PRIN, where s 0 and s 1 are nonnegative constants. Servicing revenues also have two components, the fee (usually 25 bps) and some value derived from float (s 2 per dollar of PRIN). Competition among mortgage originators should drive the benefits to zero, so in the absence of a contract rate premium, closing fees will be
FEE = ( c 0 + c 1 PRIN) + s 0 + PV(s 1 PRIN) -PV[PRIN(.25% + s 2 )]
Therefore
RM = RC + [(c 0 + s 0 )/PRIN + c 1 -PV( (.25% + s 2 -s 1 ))] /10
From these simple examples, it should be clear that one cannot identify "the" proper measure of scale effects without further information about the originator's production function and the determinants of a loan's duration. Unfortunately, our sensitivity analysis shows that the magnitude of the estimated jumbo-conforming spread does depend on how the regression incorporates loan-size effects. However, the estimated spread is sizable in both cases.
b. Alternative Data Trims
In our main results, we follow previous researchers in excluding near-conforming loans and deciding which "outliers" to omit by comparing each mortgage's reported effective rate to Freddie Mac's monthly average rate on new fixed-rate mortgages. Our base sample is derived by applying McKenzie's [2002] rule that omits all loans with effective rates more than 50 bps below, or more than 200 bps above, the Freddie Mac average for the origination month. However, as a robustness check, we re-ran all our regressions over three alternative samples:
• "Less Trimmed": Excludes near-conformers and loans whose RM was more than 100 bps below, or more than 200 bps above, the Freddie Mac average.
• "Not Trimmed": Includes all loans that were identified in MIRS as fixed rate contracts, except near-conforming loans.
• "Add Near-conforming": Adds near-conforming loans to the primary sample.
All three of our methods for estimating the jumbo-conforming spread (using the dummy J, using DEC_NC, and the more complex decomposition method) are robust to changing the sample in the three ways listed above. The most noticeable change when using the estimated coefficient of J to measure the spread was generated by the "Not Trimmed" alternative, which produced estimates that were on average 1 bps greater than those reported in Tables 2 and 3 .
When using the DEC_NC variable, the "Less Trimmed" and "Not Trimmed" alternatives reduced the estimated spread from the reported 24 bps to 23 bps. The decomposition method estimates were generally robust to both the "Less Trimmed" and "Not Trimmed" alternatives; the estimates were essentially unchanged for the "Less Trimmed" version, and the "Not Trimmed" sample yielded an average estimate about 3 bps greater than that of our base case. However, changing to the "Add Near-conforming" sample did affect the decomposition results somewhat, as expected.
Remember, we have found that many near-conforming loans are priced like large conforming loans. So it was not surprising that including them lowered the average decomposition estimate of the difference between conforming and nonconforming loan rates from 25 bps to 21 bps.
c. Market Controls
Using our primary sample, we tried modifying the specification in three ways. First, Ambrose et al. [2004] Second, we allowed for the possibility that loan pricing depends more on financial market conditions during the lock-in period, which may be one or two months earlier than the closing.
Similar results are obtained when we lag the market conditions variables (CM_1, CM_10, VOL_10, SPREAD, and HPI_STD) either one or two months. The estimated coefficients on J remained essentially unchanged, the DEC_NC estimated coefficients were about 3 bps greater in absolute value, and the estimates from the decomposition method were essentially unchanged.
None of these alternatives produced a substantially higher 2 R .
Third, we measured the debt market's risk aversion with a different variable. Our SPREAD series is the difference between yields on U.S. industrial bonds (Bbb-Aaa) with tenyears to maturity, obtained from Bloomberg. We created an alternative measure (SPREAD_H15) Tables 2 and 3 were essentially unchanged. Likewise, the coefficients estimated using SPREAD_H15 yielded virtually identical measures for the decomposition method shown in Table 5 . The DEC_NC estimates were about 1 bp greater in absolute value.
d. Splitting the sample 20 The correlation coefficient for SPREAD and SPREAD_H15 during our sample period is only 0.62.
We split our sample period into two parts, for two reasons. First, it provides another check on our regression specification: If it fits well in all sub-periods, our confidence in its correctness increases. Second, it has been suggested that the jumbo-conforming spread has declined in recent years (Passmore et al. [forthcoming] ). Often sample splits are arbitrary, but our sample period includes one regulatory innovation that might have reduced the jumboconforming spread by making private securitizations cheaper.
Private securitizations rely on "junior tranches" to provide credit protection to the senior (often Aaa-rated) tranches collateralized by a loan pool. Because the junior tranches absorb most of the pool's default risk, they are difficult for the loan originator to sell. Before November 2001, banks that retained junior tranches of their own pools were required to hold risk-based capital against the junior tranche plus all senior tranches, just as if the bank had instead retained the entire security. By contrast, if a bank purchased another originator's junior tranche, the capital requirement was based only on the dollar amount purchased. Thus, banks securitizing jumbo mortgages were forced either to sell their junior tranches and pay a "lemon's discount," or retain them and incur large capital charges. In November 2001, federal regulators implemented a ratings-based approach to capital requirements that effectively lowered the required capital for firms that issue private-label mortgage backed securities. This action should have reduced the jumbo-conforming spread by making it less expensive for banks to securitize jumbos.
To test this hypothesis, column (4) of Table 3 We also undertake the Blinder-Oaxaca analysis for the two sub-periods. The decomposition method estimates that the average jumbo-conforming rate differential decreased by about 5 bps after this regulatory innovation. The evidence is thus that the jumbo-conforming spread declined later in our sample period, perhaps due to a reduction in the cost of issuing private mortgage backed securities.
VII. Summary and Conclusions
The effect of GSE conforming status on the cost of a mortgage has been studied often. It is, for example, a first step in assessing the social benefits of the housing GSEs. Nearly all previous studies have employed the Federal Housing Finance Board's Monthly Interest Rate Survey (MIRS) data and a basic regression specification derived from Hendershott and Shilling [1989] . Previous estimates of the jumbo-conforming spread range from 8 to 60 basis points, and at least some authors claim that the spread has declined over time. In this paper, we use the MIRS data to assess the impact of alternative regression specification and data selection decisions on the estimated spread. We conclude that the jumbo-conforming spread is relatively large (roughly 25 bps) and has fallen somewhat after late 2001.
Although we base our analysis on the Hendershott-Shilling model, we augment that model to recognize that some differences in loan pricing reflect real economic effects beyond the loan's conforming status. Jumbo and conforming loan rates exhibit different sensitivities to LTV, the market's aversion to default risk, and short versus long-term Treasury rates. They also follow surprisingly different seasonal patterns. It is important to control for these differences when estimating the value of conforming status, and we do so in three distinct ways.
Our first method of estimating the jumbo-conforming spread involves a single equation which generalizes Hendershott and Shilling by permitting selected coefficients to differ between smaller and larger loans. These regressions imply a jumbo-conforming differential of 23-29 bps for our 1997-2003 sample period.
Our second method expands the single-equation format to take advantage of the fact that the conforming loan limit rose every year during our sample period. A jumbo loan according to this year's conforming loan limit may fall below next year's limit, so near-conforming jumbo loans closed late in the year should be much like conforming loans. Indeed, we find a significant effect of this sort, but only for loans closed in November and December. In particular, the estimation results indicate that a near-conforming loan originated in December carries an effective rate that is about 24 bps below the same-sized loan made the previous January. We also find that December near-conforming loans are priced the same as conforming loans closed the following month. These results provide particularly strong evidence of a positive jumboconforming spread, since the pricing shifts so dramatically in such a short period of time.
Our third method for estimating the value of conforming status takes account of all loan characteristics by estimating separate pricing regressions for conforming and jumbo loans. Using a technique originated for a quite different purpose by Blinder [1973] , we compute the effect of conforming (jumbo) status by estimating what the rate on an otherwise-identical jumbo (conforming) loan would have been if it were priced according to the conforming (jumbo) loan equation. When we use the conforming loans equation to price jumbo loans, Table 5 indicates a jumbo-conforming spread in the range of 22 to 25 bps. Pricing conforming loans as if they were jumbo indicates a spread of 24 to 29 bps.
All of these estimates are pretty similar, but we also find that the treatment of loan scale effects can change the estimated jumbo-conforming spread by a non-trivial amount. When loan size is measured by the log of principal instead of its inverse, the spread estimates vary more widely (between 20 and 30 bps), although their mean is the same as in Table 5 : 25 bps. We further find that near-conforming loans require special treatment. While it is tempting to compare the rates on jumbo loans just over the conforming limit to those on conforming loans just under, the smallest jumbos have unusual features that make this comparison treacherous. For example, the rates on at least some of the smaller jumbo loans must reflect unobserved credit problems, for why else would a customer take such a loan? And as just mentioned, late in the year the smallest jumbo loans will be priced as if they were conforming, which would give a false impression that conforming status has no value.
What do these results imply about the social value of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?
Taken at face value, they indicate that private securitization arrangements are more costly than securitizations occurring through the GSEs' mortgage backed securities, at least during our sample period. However, these estimates derive from observed institutional arrangements, and Passmore et al. [forthcoming] assert that the GSEs' conforming loan securitizations raise the cost of selling private mortgage pools. By this reasoning, 25 bps would be an upper bound on the GSEs' effect on mortgage rates. Conversely, curtailing GSE securitizations might remove valuable liquidity from the market, driving up all mortgage rates.
As with any statistical evidence, we must acknowledge the possibility that our regressions are not perfectly specified, and hence fail to value the features of jumbo versus conforming loans properly. And a full assessment of the social value of the housing GSEs involves other considerations that we have not even discussed here. But that analysis is needed only if we start with evidence that the jumbo-conforming spread is of an economically meaningful size. Although we find that the spread is difficult to estimate precisely, it is extremely unlikely that it is small enough to ignore. n/a n/a n/a 0.000 n/a n/a n/a 
Definitions of all variables:
Loan Terms: RM:
The contract rate of interest plus fees and charges amortized over a 10-year period multiplied by 100.
RM-CM_10: The loan's effective interest rate (RM) minus CM_10 (defined below).
PRIN:
The principal amount of the mortgage.
ln(PRIN):
The natural logarithm of the loan's principal amount, in million dollars.
INV_PRIN:
The principal amount divided into $1,000,000.
SMALL:
A dummy variable equal to unity when the loan's principal amount is less than $100,000.
J:
A dummy variable equal to unity when the loan's principal amount exceeds the conforming limit at closing.
Loan-to-value Dummies: LTV: The mortgage's principal amount divided by the property purchase price multiplied by 100.
LTV_0:
A dummy variable equal to unity when the loan-to-value ratio does not exceed 0.75. (omitted category)
LTV_1:
A dummy variable equal to unity when the loan-to-value ratio exceeds 0.75 but is less than or equal to 0.80.
LTV_2:
A dummy variable equal to unity when the loan-to-value ratio exceeds 0.80 but is less than or equal to 0.90.
LTV_3:
A dummy variable equal to unity when the loan-to-value ratio exceeds 0.90.
J_LTV_0:
A dummy variable equal to unity when LTV_0=1 and JUMBO=1. (omitted category)
J_LTV_1:
A dummy variable equal to unity when LTV_1=1 and JUMBO=1.
J_LTV_2:
A dummy variable equal to unity when LTV_2=1 and JUMBO=1.
J_LTV_3:
A dummy variable equal to unity when LTV_3=1 and JUMBO=1.
Origination Dummies: FEES: A dummy variable equal to unity when fees and charges were associated with the loan.
NEW:
A dummy variable equal to unity when the loan is associated with a newly built house.
BANK:
A dummy variable equal to unity when the loan is originated by a commercial bank (as opposed to a mortgage company or thrift institution). (omitted category)
MTGCO:
A dummy variable equal to unity when the loan is originated by a mortgage company (as opposed to a bank or thrift institution).
THRIFT: A dummy variable equal to unity when the mortgage loan is originated by a thrift institution (as opposed to a bank or mortgage company).
State Dummies:
CA:
A dummy variable equal to unity when the purchased property is located in California.
MD:
A dummy variable equal to unity when the purchased property is located in Maryland.
NJ:
A dummy variable equal to unity when the purchased property is located in New Jersey.
VA:
A dummy variable equal to unity when the purchased property is located in Virginia. 
OTHER_STATE

CM_1:
The monthly average of daily yields on the constant maturity Treasury bond with one year to maturity, multiplied by 100.
CM_10:
The monthly average of daily yields on the constant maturity Treasury bond with ten years to maturity, multiplied by 100.
CM_SLOPE: The monthly difference of average daily yields on the constant maturity Treasury bonds with ten years and one year to maturity, multiplied by 100 (CM_10 -CM_1).
SPREAD:
The monthly average yield spread (Baa-Aaa) for U.S. industrial bonds with ten years to maturity, multiplied by 100 (obtained from Bloomberg).
SPREAD_H15:
The monthly average ((Baa-Aaa) for U.S. corporate bonds, multiplied by 100, calculated from the Federal Reserve's H.15 Statistical Release.
VOL_10:
The standard deviation of the daily 10-year Treasury rate over the sixty trading days preceding the month-end at which loans are closed, multiplied by 100.
HPI_STD:
The standard deviation of OFHEO's state-level house price index over the preceding eight quarters for the state in which the mortgage property is located.
POST_REG: A dummy variable equal to unity when JUMBO=1 and the loan was closed after November 2001. (Table 2 , Column 5). Many coefficients are not reported here to save space, but are available upon request from the authors. LTV_1, LTV_2, and LTV_3, equal unity when LTV exceeds 75% but not 80%, exceeds 80% but not 90%, and exceeds 90%, respectively, and are relative to LTV_0 (LTV≤75%). INV_PRIN is $1,000,000/PRIN. CM_1 (CM_10) is the monthly average of the daily yields for the 1-year (10-year) constant maturity U.S. Treasury bond. VOL_10 is the standard deviation of the trailing 60-day yield on the 10-year constant maturity U.S. Treasury bond. SPREAD equals the monthly industrial bond yield difference (Baa-Aaa). HPI_STD is the standard deviation of the OFHEO's state-level house price index over the preceding eight quarters. The J_LTV_i dummies equal unity when the respective LTV_i dummies equal unity and JUMBO=1. The month_NC dummies equal unity when the loan was closed in the respective month and JUMBO=1, but PRIN does not exceed the next year's conforming loan limit. POST_REG is a dummy that equals unity when JUMBO=1 and the mortgage was closed after November 2001. All estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level (two-tailed test), unless noted otherwise. (6), where j is the base size group (whose coefficients are b) and c is the comparison group (whose coefficients are a). The groups are those defined in Table 4 : 25-80, 80-100, NC -120, 120-200 percent of the conforming limit. For example, the bottom entry in the first column (0.226) indicates that the average loan between 120 and 200 percent of the conforming loan limit would have been priced 21.8 bps lower had it been smaller (between 25 and 80% of the limit) with the same other features. Conversely, the upper-right triangle reports the mean values of (ba)w c it from equation (7). For example, the top right cell indicates that loans between 25 and 80 percent of the conforming limit would have been priced 26.4 bps higher had they been valued like loans from the 120-200 size group. Table 3 , Column 3 regression. Many coefficients are not reported here to save space, but are available upon request from the authors. LTV_1, LTV_2, and LTV_3, equal unity when LTV exceeds 75% but not 80%, exceeds 80% but not 90%, and exceeds 90%, respectively, and are relative to LTV_0 (LTV≤75%). INV_PRIN is $1,000,000/PRIN. ln(PRIN) is the natural logarithm of PRIN/$1,000,000. The SMALL dummy equals unity when PRIN < $100,000. CM_1 (CM_10) is the monthly average of the daily yields for the 1-year (10-year) constant maturity U.S. Treasury bond. VOL_10 is the standard deviation of the trailing 60-day yield on the 10-year constant maturity U.S. Treasury bond. SPREAD equals the monthly industrial bond yield difference (BaaAaa). HPI_STD is the standard deviation of the OFHEO's state-level house price index over the preceding eight quarters. The J_LTV_i dummies equal unity when the respective LTV_i dummies equal unity and JUMBO=1. The month_NC dummies equal unity when the loan was closed in the respective month and JUMBO=1, but PRIN does not exceed the next year's conforming loan limit. POST_REG is a dummy that equals unity when JUMBO=1 and the mortgage was closed after November 2001. All estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level (two-tailed test), unless noted otherwise.
